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Book Reviews: POLITICAL THEORY June 1993 
Willful Liberalism: Voluntarism and Individuality in 
Political Theory and Practice. By Richard E. Flath- 
man. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992. 232p. 
$31.50 cloth, $13.95 paper. 
This is an elegant and studied little volume, rather 
more difficult than it lets on. Flathman wants to argue 
that liberals are sorely in need of a more robust under- 
standing of the will and individuality than they now 
possess, that they (or we) should be enthusiastically 
embracing what might seem to be some tendentious 
commitments about the partial but inescapable opacity 
of other selves. He does so by working through a large 
number of texts and authors-some only contentiously 
called liberal (Hobbes); others not conceivably liberal 
(William of Ockham, Augustine, Nietzsche); and still 
others not obviously interested in anything narrowly 
political at all (Wittgenstein, William James). The exege- 
ses, sometimes dense and always deft, are aimed at 
excavating and reclaiming that robust understanding we 
allegedly lack. So they are not in the first instance 
intended for, say, Hobbes scholars or James scholars. 
Flathman does not quite explain his impatience with 
reigning liberal theories. I take it his sense is that there is 
too much sweet reasonableness, too much of a commu- 
nity dedicated to shared principles of justice and public 
debate. But this vision is not just an implausible attempt 
to fashion society as a learned graduate seminar. It is 
also a bit soporific; and one would have to worry that the 
individuals composing it were bland, colorless, inter- 
changeable. Or so, I conjecture, Flathman thinks. 
That may make it sound as if Flathman thinks that 
individualism (or "individuality") is somehow the op- 
posite of being socially situated (and surely many recent 
antiliberals write that way). What emerges from Flath- 
man's juggling of these notions (under titles like "Indi- 
viduality and Plurality, Sociality and Politicality," "So- 
ciality, Individuality, Plurality, and Politics," etc.) is a 
sharp riposte to any such misbegotten notion. Flathman 
may want to celebrate partially opaque individuals with 
eccentrically strong wills; but he realizes full well that 
only in certain kinds of communities or social orders can 
such individuals emerge in the first place. Readers who 
still believe that liberalism is somehow a presociological 
or antisocial doctrine would be well advised to dwell on 
this strand of his argument. 
There is something mildly paradoxical about the struc- 
ture of Flathman's position. Think of a theory as a web 
of beliefs and leave it an open question (an "empirical 
question," as they say in the trade) how densely tangled 
together the strands of the web are and whether some 
parts of the web are relatively independent of others. 
Hence arises an antinomy such that while theories of 
individuality must be independent enough that we can 
imagine lifting them from Ockham and inserting them 
into liberalism, they must not be so independent that 
they are just freely spinning gears stuck on the side of 
the real conceptual machinery (or else inserting them 
will not matter). 
474 
American Political Science Review Vol. 87, No. 2 
There is, indeed, logical room for that. But at the very 
least, one would like to hear more about what "appro- 
priating" or "inserting" these commitments into liberal- 
ism would mean. Nor, presumably, is a liberal (or any) 
web of beliefs, built like a Motorola color television, so 
that we might just snap out the old defective module 
labeled "views of self and society" and insert the new 
one. Presumably, that is, inserting these commitments 
will somehow change the rest of liberalism if only by 
putting other liberal commitments in a new context. But 
Flathman does not take up the constructive task of even 
sketching what our new and improved liberalism will 
look like in any serious detail. 
I do not mean to catalog the failings of Flathman's 
book, but to suggest how much it opens up for us, how 
much further work along these lines might be done. In a 
debate as viciously repetitive as that between liberals 
and their critics, the act of putting a quirky, talented, 
provocative sketch on the table is remarkable. 
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